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Self-organizing cyber-physical systems are expected to
become increasingly important in the context of Indus-
try 4.0 automation as well as in everyday scenarios. Re-
silient communication is crucial for such systems. In gen-
eral, this can be achieved with redundant communication
paths. Mathematically, the amount of redundant paths is
expressed with the network connectivity. A high network
connectivity is required for collaboration and system-wide
self-adaptation even when nodes fail or get compromised
by an attacker. In this paper, we analyze the network con-
nectivity of a communication network for large distributed
cyber-physical systems. For this, we simulate the commu-
nication structure of a CPS with different network param-
eters to determine its resilience. With our results, we also
deduce the required network connectivity for a given num-
ber of failing or compromised nodes.
1 Introduction
Based on definitions from literature ([32, 23, 4]), we de-
fine a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) as a distributed sys-
tem which integrates computational and physical pro-
cesses and consists of multiple interconnected nodes. The
main property of such systems is to adapt to changing
physical processes, which cannot be predicted entirely at
design time. This makes CPS interesting for the Industry
4.0 context as well as everyday scenarios. In Industry 4.0,
highly automated systems need to deal with complex pro-
cesses taking place in the physical world in an autonomous
manner. In [24], the authors showed that CPS can im-
prove automated processes significantly by exploiting self-
* properties.
An example for a CPS is a Smart Camera Network
(SCN). Smart cameras are video cameras with a built-
in computation unit that can be utilized for various tasks,
e.g., image processing, object localization or object track-
ing. With the integrated wired or wireless communication
devices, smart cameras are able to communicate with each
other. Today, the most common scenario for a SCN are
the detection of intruders in restricted areas or the surveil-
lance of high risk areas. In general, the observed informa-
tion from single cameras is used to classify processes in
the whole environment for assessing its current situation
and adapting the behavior of single nodes, e.g., to follow
suspects. A detailed smart camera scenario in an organic
computing context is presented in [9].
Another example for a CPS is a distributed network
intrusion detection system (IDS) for securing cooperate
networks with several branches. At each branch, multiple
nodes observe and classify all passing traffic as suspicious
or normal. This can be based on rules (e.g., [30]) or a
Gaussian mixture model (e.g., [14]). The nodes exchange
their observed information regularly to increase the chance
of detecting distributed attacks. Such attacks might not
be detected by individual nodes, but with the aggregated
information the detection possibility increases and allows
for faster and more efficient adaptation by each node.
In both given examples, the system must be able to
adapt to complex situations in the physical environment
going beyond the scope of a single node. A necessary fea-
ture for this is the information exchange about the phys-
ical environment between the nodes. This information
must be exchanged via communication channels, which
can be either direct or indirect via other nodes. However,
we must consider that nodes or communication channels
might fail. Additionally, there exist a number of security
weaknesses as described in, e.g., [4, 5, 8, 22, 32]. More
specifically, since some nodes might be publicly accessible
in the physical world, we must consider that they can be
compromised by an attacker. If a node is compromised,
all communication from or through that node must also
be considered compromised. To still achieve reliable self-
adaption, we must never rely on information from single
nodes, and we require redundant communication chan-
nels for resilient inter-node communication [19]. More
precisely, to tolerate compromised nodes, there must be
multiple node-disjoint communication paths through the
network for any node pair. The minimum number of node-
disjoint paths for any node pair in a network is called the
network connectivity of the communication network.
Highly distributed self-organizing CPS exhibit coordi-
nation schemata and communication requirements which
are similar to structured overlay networks. Therefore,
when designing a CPS, we can benefit from proven com-
munication concepts from such networks. Especially, dis-
tributed hash tables (DHT) are suitable for information
exchange and storage in CPS. They avoid centralistic
structures and, therefore, bottle necks and single points of
failure. We, therefore, assume that the nodes of the CPS
are organized as a structured overlay network, specifically
as a DHT. For our analysis, we chose a DHT formed by
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Kademlia [26] as it is one of the most used protocols. Next
to receiving much attention in the scientific community, it
has been successfully deployed in several real life applica-
tions with thousands to tens of thousands of nodes, e.g.,
BitTorrent [25].
However, the applicability of Kademlia to a large scale
CPS as well as its network connectivity have not yet been
researched. A high network connectivity is a requirement
for designing a resilient CPS. Therefore, in this paper,
we evaluate the network connectivity of Kademlia to de-
termine its general suitability for designing a resilient and
self-adapting CPS. We present the results of extensive sim-
ulations with different network configurations and mea-
sure their effect on the network connectivity (resilience)
and recovery (self-healing).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, we
discuss related research about DHT network connectivity
in Section 2 and present our assumptions in Section 3.
After that, we briefly describe in Section 4 the Kademlia
protocol and the mathematical foundations for computing
the network connectivity. Based on this, we preset and
discuss the results of our connectivity measurements in
Section 5. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 6
with a brief summary and provide an outlook on future
research.
2 Related Work
Kademlia and DHTs in general have been studied exten-
sively in the scientific literature. A survey about research
on robust peer-to-peer networks from 2006 [29] already
lists several hundred references. Another survey from 2011
with focus on security aspects in DHT, reaches close to
a hundred references [34]. Despite the large amount of
publications in general, the global network connectivity of
Kademlia has not been thoroughly evaluated. We limit
our discussion of related work to literature with relevance
for connectivity of structured overlay networks built with
Kademlia or it’s descendants.
In [21], the authors simulate Kademlia networks and ap-
ply churn (joining/leaving of nodes) to evaluate resilience.
While the basic premise is similar to ours, they measure
response times and number of message hops, not network
connectivity. In [20], the authors insert nodes into a real-
world BitTorrent network. From these nodes, they try to
make contact with other nodes in the network to assess the
general reachability of nodes in that network. The main
focus of this paper is on connectivity problems within the
network caused by technical obstacles such as firewalls and
network address translation (NAT). Furthermore, the au-
thors analyze connectivity properties of small groups of
nodes such as “transitivity” and “reciprocality”. They
do not measure the network-wide connectivity. Similarly,
the authors of [7] insert nodes into real-world overlay net-
works built by the BitTorrent protocol to measure round
trip times and message rates for resource lookups. Addi-
tionally, they measure “connectivity artifacts” and “com-
munication locality”. Artifacts emerge from nodes mak-
ing contact with the author’s nodes, but cannot be con-
tacted by them. As in [20], the authors conclude that such
a behaviour is most likely caused by firewalls and NAT.
The communication locality measurements show to what
degree nodes in the DHT preferably communicate with
other nodes that, according to the protocol’s definition of
node distance, are near to them. While both properties
are related to the network connectivity, it is not measured
or derived. The authors of [31] present a crawling soft-
ware for capturing connectivity graphs of networks built
by the KAD protocol, a descendant of Kademlia. They
insert specially modified crawling nodes into a real-world
network to contact other nodes and dump the contents
of their routing tables. The dumped routing tables are
then used to create a connectivity graph of the network.
Though they capture connectivity graphs, their focus is on
the crawling process, and they do not perform any anal-
ysis on the captured graphs. In [1], the authors propose
different measures to make Kademlia networks more re-
silient towards malicious nodes. One of those measures
is the use of node-disjoint paths for lookup procedures.
The authors measure success rates for lookup procedures
using different numbers of disjoint paths. Their simula-
tions imply that a certain average level of connectivity is
present in a network, but they do not measure the actual
connectivity.
In contrast, our main goal is to determine the network
connectivity of Kademlia in dependence of its parameters.
Some of the related work, e.g., [1], even rely on a given
network connectivity, but it was neither determined ana-
lytically nor experimentally before.
3 System Model
The CPS is organized as a distributed system consisting
of multiple networked nodes which interact via commu-
nication channels. The basic functioning of one node is
not dependent on the functioning of others. Each node
has sensors and actuators to observe a part of the physical
environment and to interact with it.
The self-organization and specifically the self-
adaptation at runtime is based on the Observer/Controller
architecture (e.g., [33, 18]). To achieve sufficient ob-
servation and adaptation and to choose appropriate
means of control, multiple nodes must cooperate. This
requires the exchange of information among the nodes.
Therefore, while each node has its own local task, it also
communicates and collaborates with other nodes towards
a global system goal. Each node is able to communicate
with any other node, either directly or indirectly via
others. The communication structure of the CPS is
organized as a structured overlay network, i.e., as a DHT
based on Kademlia (cf. Section 4.1).
We assume the presence of an attacker with the goal of
disturbing, disabling or controlling nodes of the CPS. We
call a node which has been successfully attacked a compro-
mised node. There are several other causes exhibiting the
same effect as a compromised node. Without additional
measures, these are indistinguishable from an attack, e.g.,
maintenance, failures from defects, or other disturbances
like power outages. If an attacker has compromised a
node, we assume that she is able to fully impersonate the
2
node towards the rest of the CPS. Therefore, an attacker
can disseminate information into the network as a legit-
imate part of the system and also deny requests coming
from other nodes and, thus, hinder or prevent informa-
tion exchange. Communication between two nodes is not
always direct, so other nodes can be necessary for mes-
sage transfer. Therefore, a compromised node includes
the case of compromised communication channels. Addi-
tionally, we assume that the attacker can subvert at most
a arbitrary nodes at any time.
4 Connectivity
In this section, first, we present the properties and mech-
anisms of Kademlia important for routing and contact
management. To analyze the network connectivity, we
introduce the mathematical foundations to transfer the
network structure of Kademlia into the domain of graph
theory by creating a connectivity graph. Next, we de-
scribe the mathematical algorithms and necessary graph
transformations for calculating the graph connectivity. Fi-
nally, we use the mathematical foundations to define the
resilience of the communication network.
4.1 Kademlia
With Kademlia, each node and each stored data object is
identified by a numerical id with the fixed bit-length b.
These identifiers are generated from a node’s network ad-
dress or the data object respectively, using a cryptograph-
ically secure hash function with the goal of equal distribu-
tion of identifiers in the identifier space. Each node main-
tains a routing table with identifiers and network addresses
of other nodes, its so-called contacts. The routing table
consists of b so-called k-buckets to store the contacts of the
node. The buckets are indexed from 0 to b−1, and the con-
tacts are distributed into these buckets depending on the
distance of their identifiers id i and the node’s id. For this,
the distance between two identifiers is computed using the
XOR metric, meaning that for two identifiers ida and idb
the distance is dist(ida, idb) = ida⊕ idb, interpreted as an
integer value. The buckets are populated with those con-
tacts id i fulfilling the condition 2
i ≤ dist(id , id i) < 2i+1,
with i being the bucket index. This means that the bucket
with the highest index covers half of the id space, the next
lower bucket a quarter of the id space, and so on. The
maximum number of contacts stored in one bucket is k.
Next to b and k, the third defining property of a Kadem-
lia setup is α, which determines how many contacts are
queried in parallel when a node wants to either locate an-
other node or retrieve/store a data object. The Kademlia
authors propose to set b = 160, k = 20 and α = 3.
The nodes of a Kademlia network can locate resources
(other nodes, data objects) by means of their identifiers.
Given a target identifier, a node queries α nodes from its
routing table nearest to that targets identifier. In turn,
each queried node answers with its own list of nodes closest
to the target identifier. This way, the requesting node
iteratively gets closer to the target identifier. This process
ends when a number of k nodes have been successfully
contacted, or no more progress is made in getting nearer
to the target identifier.
In addition to acting as a building block for a larger
self-organizing system, we find it remarkable that Kadem-
lia itself also exhibits self-* properties. Depending on its
own identifier and that of other nodes, each node will build
a different routing table, i.e., perform self-configuration.
Emerging properties for the overlay network are its con-
nectivity and a small number of hops necessary for locating
nodes or data objects. The protocol enables nodes to de-
tect stale contacts in their routing table and replace them
to restore connectivity, thereby exhibiting self-healing be-
haviour. On replacing a stale node from the routing table,
the most recently seen node from a list of possible replace-
ments is chosen. This is done to optimize the chance of
a non-stale replacement node. By doing so, the network
continuously self-optimizes its routing.
4.2 Connectivity Graph
The representation of the network structure as a connec-
tivity graph enables the application of concepts and al-
gorithms from graph theory to analyze properties of the
network. The connectivity graph D(V,E), with the ver-
tices V and edges E, is a directed graph representation of
the nodes and their routing tables. Each vertex from the
connectivity graph represents a distinct node from the net-
work. Hence, the number of vertices equals the number
of network nodes. To construct the connectivity graph,
we add edges the graph according to the routing table of
Kademlia. For each node pair id i, id j represented in the
graph by vertices v and w respectively, we insert the di-
rected edge (v, w) into the set of edges E if and only if
node id j is present in the routing table of id i.
Generally, in network graphs, a capacity value is often
assigned to the edges for expressing the communication
bandwidth between nodes. This is not a necessity for con-
nectivity graphs, since the existence of the edges is enough
to indicate a connection between nodes. However, since it
is necessary for later steps, we assign a capacity of 1 to
each edge.
4.3 Vertex Connectivity for Vertex Pairs
A directed edge in the connectivity graph D(V,E) can
be interpreted as an one-way water pipe. The maximum
amount of water able to flow through the pipe per time
unit is modeled by the edge capacity. The maximum flow
between two vertices v and w is the sum of the capacities
of the minimum edge cut. This is the set of edges with the
smallest total capacity whose removal would cut off any
flow from v to w. In other words, the minimum edge cut
is the bottle neck which determines the maximum possible
flow v to w.
Analog to the minimum edge cut for two vertices v and
w, the minimum vertex cut is the minimum number of ver-
tices whose removal cuts all paths from v to w. The order
of the minimum vertex cut is called the vertex connectiv-
ity from v to w, i.e., κ(v, w). Menger’s theorem [27] for
directed graphs [2] states that for the two non-adjacent
vertices v and w the vertex connectivity is equal to the
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maximum number of pairwise vertex-disjoint paths from
v to w. This number correlates directly with the commu-
nication resilience (cf. Section 4.5). Therefore, to evaluate
the resilience, we need to calculate the vertex connectivity.
There are multiple algorithms to compute the maxi-
mum flow/minimum edge cut between any two vertices
in a graph. However, in general, the vertex connectivity
does not correspond to the maximum flow/minimum edge
cut. To bridge the gap from computing the maximum
flow/minimum edge cut to computing the vertex connec-
tivity, we apply Even’s algorithm (e.g., [10, 11, 12, 13]). It
transforms the connectivity graph D(V,E) such that the
maximum flow between two non-adjacent vertices is equal
to their vertex connectivity. This allows the application
of maximum flow algorithms to calculate the vertex con-
nectivity. Even’s graph transformation is applied on the
original connectivity graph D(V,E) consisting of n ver-
tices and m edges. We assume that D(V,E) has neither
self-loops nor parallel edges. The problem transformation
is done by applying the following steps to each vertex of
D(V,E):
• Let s be a vertex of the directed graph D(V,E) with
the incoming degree of din,s and outgoing degree of
dout,s.
• Split s into the two vertices s′ (incoming vertex) and
s′′ (outgoing vertex).
• All incoming edges of s point to s′, so that it has the
incoming degree din,s.
• Make all outgoing edges of s originate from s′′, so that
it has the outgoing degree dout,s.
• Insert the edge (s′, s′′) with capacity 1, so that the
outgoing degree of s′ and the incoming degree of s′′
are both 1.
The resulting graphD′(V ′, E′) has 2n vertices andm+n
edges and can be used to calculate the vertex connectivity
by applying a max flow algorithm. An example for such a
graph transformation is shown in Figure 1.
4.4 Vertex Connectivity for Graphs
The vertex connectivity of a graph D(V,E) is the min-
imum of the vertex connectivities of all pairs of distinct
non-adjacent vertices in the graph, i.e.,
κ(D) = min(κ(v, w)) : v 6= w∧ (v, w) /∈ E ∧v, w ∈ V. (1)
If D(V,E) is not a complete graph, we determine the ver-
tex connectivity κ(v, w) for a pair of non-adjacent ver-
tices v and w by computing the maximum flow from out-
going vertex v′′ to the incoming vertex w′ in the trans-
formed graph D′(V ′, E′). Therefore, the vertex connectiv-
ity κ(D) for the whole graph can be determined by finding
the minimum of the maximum flows between all pairs of
outgoing and incoming vertices in the transformed graph
D′(V ′, E′). If D(V,E) is complete, meaning that any ver-
tex is adjacent to any other vertex, the vertex connectivity
is the number of vertices in the graph n minus one [3].
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1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
a''a' e''e' i''i'
h''h'
g''g'
f''f'
d''d'
c''c'
b''b'
1
(b) Transformed Network Graph D′.
Figure 1: Example graph transformation for Even’s algo-
rithm. From vertex a to vertex i, the connec-
tivity graph in (a) shows a maximum flow of 3
and a vertex connectivity κ(a, i) = 1. For a′′
and i′ in the transformed graph D′ in (b), the
maximum flow equals the vertex connectivity of
1.
To find the minimum of the maximum flows for a trans-
formed directed graph D′(V ′, E′) with 2n vertices, it is
generally necessary to compute the maximum flow for all
n(n−1) distinct pairs of outgoing/incoming vertices. This
makes the time complexity in terms of maximum flow com-
putations O(n2).
To find the minimum of the maximum flows for a trans-
formed undirected graph G′(V ′, E′) with 2n vertices, it is
sufficient to compute the maximum flow for n− 1 distinct
pairs of outgoing/incoming vertices [17]. This makes the
time complexity in terms of maximum flow computations
O(n).
4.5 Resilience
As stated in our system model (Section 3), we assume that
an attacker is able to subvert a number of a nodes of the
CPS. We require that information exchange in the CPS is
still reliable even under this condition.
We call a CPS that can function properly even when
a number of r nodes have been subverted, an r-resilient
CPS. This means that with r subverted nodes a reliable
path must still exist between any pair of nodes in the net-
work. Hence, to tolerate a compromised nodes, we need an
r-resilient CPS with r ≥ a. This is fulfilled when the con-
nectivity κ(D) is greater than the number of compromised
nodes, i.e., κ(D) > r. Since each compromised node can
disconnect at most one of the κ(D) node-disjoint paths
(cf. Section 4), there is still at least one reliable path re-
maining.
Therefore, the correlation between the graph connec-
tivity, the resilience and the number of attackers can be
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summarized in Equation 2.
κ(D) > r ≥ a (2)
From this equation, we are able to determine (1) the re-
silience of a CPS for a given network as r = κ(D)− 1 and
(2) the required connectivity of a network for a certain a
as κ(D) > a.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we first describe our simulation environ-
ment, i.e., the tools used to determine the network con-
nectivity. After that, we present our evaluation methodol-
ogy and the simulation scenarios. Finally, we present the
achieved results and discuss them.
5.1 Environment
For our simulations, we use the network simulation soft-
ware PeerSim [28]. It is implemented with the Java pro-
gramming language and includes an event protocol class
for event driven simulations. We added Kademlia as an in-
stance of this “EDProtocol”. Additionally we wrote soft-
ware components to provide functionality for creating net-
work churn (addition and removal of nodes) as well as re-
questing data objects and disseminating information into
the network.
For the graph transformation, we implemented Even’s
algorithm in Java. To calculate the maximum flow be-
tween a pair of vertices, we use the software “HIPR” [16].
It is a C implementation of the hi-level variant of the push-
relabel algorithm presented in [6]. In its original form,
HIPR only calculates the maximum flow for one vertex
pair. Therefore, we modified it to support calculations
with multiple vertex pairs per program invocation. As
adjacent vertex pairs do not influence the graph connec-
tivity in our context (cf. 4.3), we also added program logic
to detect and skip such pairs. We further wrote multiple
software tools and scripts for both generation of maximum
flow computing tasks, and validation and aggregation of
the output created from these tasks.
We ran our simulations on two computers each with
an Intel i7 quad core CPU with hyper-threading. For
the maximum flow computations, we used a Linux cluster
provided by our University. We distributed the computa-
tions to 24 cluster nodes each providing two 16 core AMD
Opteron 6276 CPUs (2.3 GHz) with hyper-threading.
5.2 Methodology
To calculate the graph connectivity over time, we persist
the connectivity graph of a network at pre-defined time
stamps in a simulation. For that purpose, we interrupt
the simulation and save the current contents of the rout-
ing tables of all network nodes to disk into a snapshot file.
We use this snapshot file to transform the connectivity
graph with Even’s algorithm. Next, we convert the trans-
formed graph to the supported input format of HIPR (i.e.,
DIMACS [15]) to calculate the maximum flow.
The push-relabel algorithm used for the maximum flow
computation for a single vertex pair in HIPR has a worst
case time complexity of O(n2√m), where n is the number
of vertices and m the number of edges in the processed
graph [6]. Since the transformed graph D′(V ′, E′) con-
tains 2n nodes and n+m edges, the complexity of calcu-
lating the maximum flow of a single vertex pair in D′ is
O(n2√n+m). To calculate the graph connectivity κ(D′),
we need to apply the above calculation on the transformed
graph from all outgoing vertices to all incoming vertices,
i.e., n(n − 1) times. Thus, the overall time complexity
for calculating κ(D′) is O(n4√n+m). This complexity
makes the maximum flow computation very expensive.
For instance, the full maximum flow computation for a
transformed connectivity graph with 2500 vertices takes
about 125 hours on a single core of our hardware.
The nodes in Kademlia attempt to add each other to
their respective routing tables. This would result in an
undirected connectivity graph. However, due to size re-
strictions of the buckets in the routing table and race con-
ditions, these attempts are not always successful. Hence,
there is no guarantee for the connectivity graph being
undirected. Nevertheless, our analysis of simulation runs
shows that the connectivity graphs come very close to be-
ing undirected. This allows us to reduce the amount of
maximum flow computations from n(n− 1) to c ·n(n− 1),
0 < c ≤ 1. We achieve this reduction by only using a
percentage c ·n of outgoing vertices for the maximum flow
calculation. Since the outgoing degree dout,v of a vertex
v is an upper limit for the outgoing flow, we select those
c · n outgoing vertices with the smallest dout . As we cal-
culate the maximum flow from only a percentage c · n of
outgoing vertices to all n − 1 incoming vertices, also the
limiting incoming degree din is still considered. We ver-
ified this with 20 randomly selected connectivity graphs,
for which we performed a full analysis, i.e., calculated the
maximum flow for all n(n−1) vertex pairs. In all 20 cases,
c = 0.02 (2%) was sufficient to determine the minimum of
the maximum flows, i.e., the graphs vertex connectivity.
5.3 Scenarios
To determine which environment and Kademlia param-
eters influence the connectivity of the network we de-
vised five dimensions for the simulations, i.e., network
size, network setup, network churn, network traffic, and
the Kademlia bucket size k.
Network Size
We consider two different scenarios for the network size,
i.e., a network with 250 nodes and one with 2500 nodes.
Our choice for these network sizes is closely related to real
world CPS’ given in Section 1. For the smart camera sce-
nario, a large number of smart cameras may be necessary
for reliably observing and controlling a large industrial
complex. Thus, we simulate it with 250 nodes. In con-
trast, a distributed IDS can be used for securing corporate
networks spanning over several branches. Such networks
usually comprise several hundreds to thousands of nodes.
Exemplarily, we choose 2500 nodes for this scenario.
5
Network Setup
The initial bootstrap procedure to create the network is
done sequentially. A new node joins every 180 milliseconds
until the intended network size is reached. We distinguish
three different scenarios for setting up the network, i.e.,
which nodes are used as bootstrap nodes. In the first
network setup, a new node chooses the bootstrap node
randomly from all already joined nodes – we call this the
random scenario (R). In this scenario, the simulation may
select any node to be removed from the network during
simulation runs with churn. The second network setup is
the same as before, but there is a group of five nodes in
the network which will never be removed during simula-
tion runs with churn. We call this the stable scenario (S ).
Finally, in the third network setup, a new node always
selects one of the stable nodes as its bootstrapping node.
i.e., the bootstrapping scenario (B). We name the aver-
age connectivity of all measured node pairs Ravg, Savg or
Bavg. We name the minimum connectivity of the network
Rmin, Smin or Bmin.
Network Churn
We consider five different churn scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, we do not consider any churn, i.e., no new nodes
join, and no nodes are removed. In the second scenario
(0/1), we remove a single node from network in every
minute and add no nodes. Similarly, we add one node
and also remove one in every minute in our third scenario
(1/1). The last two scenarios are so-called burst scenarios.
In the forth scenario (0/19), we remove 19 nodes simul-
taneously (burst) every 10 minutes. We chose a burst of
19, as it is slightly less than the default bucket size for
Kademlia (k = 20). Finally, in the fifth scenario (0/40),
we simultaneously remove 40 nodes every 10 minutes. We
chose 40 to determine the impact of concurrently removing
significantly more nodes than the bucket size.
Network Traffic
We distinguish two different scenarios with respect to data
traffic, i.e., with and without data traffic. In the sce-
nario with data traffic, all nodes regularly look up data
objects and disseminate them. For this, each node per-
forms 10 lookup procedures an 1 dissemination procedure
per minute during the whole simulation. In the scenario
without data traffic, the node do not lookup data ob-
jects or disseminate them. However, for maintenance pur-
poses Kademlia requires each node to perform a so-called
“bucket-refresh” every 60 minutes. For this, each node
randomly selects ids from its contacts and performs lookup
procedures for these ids. This way, it can learn about pre-
viously unknown contacts and stale contacts in its routing
table. Hence, even in the scenario without data traffic,
there is some basic background traffic.
Kademlia Bucket Size
In Kademlia, the bucket size k is directly responsible
for the number of contacts a node can keep in its rout-
ing table. To determine its effect on the network con-
nectivity, we differentiate four different values for k, i.e.,
k ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30}.
In summary, we have five dimensions with several sce-
narios for each of them, i.e., 2·3·5·2·4 = 240 combinations.
We simulated all combinations to determine how the di-
mension and the connectivity correlate. We present the
results of selected simulations in the next section.
5.4 Results
In this section, we first present the simulation and mea-
surement results for a network size of 250 nodes (Simula-
tion 1-5) and 2500 afterwards (Simulation 6-11).
Simulation 1
In this simulation, we used the random scenario for the
network setup with a network churn of 0/1 and without
network traffic. The bucket sizes are 5, 10, 20 and 30.
We present the results in Figure 2. We can observe two
effects after the churn starts: The minimum connectivity
drops between refresh cycles, but increases overall. We as-
sign this to the circumstance that with decreasing network
size, less nodes compete for places in the size limited rout-
ing tables. Also, nodes that left the network are removed
from the routing tables and others can take their place.
The churn enables a network restructuring that leads to
an increase in the minimum connectivity. This contin-
ues until the network size becomes too small to sustain
this behaviour. Towards the end of the simulation, with
10 nodes left in the network, for each bucket size except
for 5, the network becomes fully connected, resulting in a
connectivity of 9.
In another simulation with the same parameters but
without the churn, Kademlia establishes a minimum con-
nectivity of k for all values above 5 after bootstrap. After
the first bucket refresh cycle at the 60 minute mark, the
connectivity of 5 is also reached with k = 5. Afterwards,
these levels do not change for the remainder of the simu-
lation time. We did not include a graph for the simulation
without churn here since the results of Simulation 1 in Fig-
ure 2 displays this exact behaviour in the first 60 minutes.
Simulation 2
In this simulation, we used the random scenario for the
network setup with a network churn of 0/1 and with net-
work traffic. The bucket sizes are 5, 10, 20 and 30. We
present the results in Figure 3. In comparison with Sim-
ulation 1, the network traffic allows for faster adaptation
with respect to removed nodes in the network. The over-
all connectivity reaches higher values than in Simulation
1. Towards the end of the simulation, with 10 nodes left
in the network, again for the k values 10 to 30 the network
becomes fully connected, while with k = 5 the connectiv-
ity becomes 6.
Simulation 3
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenarios for network setup with a network churn
of 0/19 (burst). The simulation uses network traffic, and
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Figure 2: Size 250, multiple k, churn 0/1, without traffic
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Figure 3: Size 250, multiple k, churn 0/1, with traffic
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Figure 4: Size 250, k=20, churn 0/19, with traffic
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Figure 5: Size 250, k=20, churn 0/40, with traffic
the bucket size is 20. We present the results in Figure 4,
All three scenarios initially reach a connectivity of 20 or
21. Therefore, a removal of 19 nodes does not disconnect
the network. The network traffic enables sufficient adap-
tation by the nodes, so that even several burst removals
in a row leave the network connected. With decreasing
network size, the connectivity even increases – an effect
we also saw in Simulations 1 and 2.
Simulation 4
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenario for network setup with a network churn of
0/40 (burst). The simulation uses network traffic, and the
bucket size is 20. We present the results in Figure 5. As
in Simulation 3, the three scenarios initially reach a con-
nectivity of 20 or 21. The networks are able to sustain
a repeated removal of 40 nodes without becoming discon-
nected. This is a significant result: Even for repeated
churn of twice the initial connectivity, the network stays
connected.
Simulation 5
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenario for network setup with a network churn of
1/1. The simulation uses network traffic, and the bucket
size is 20. We present the results in Figure 6. In con-
trast to the previous simulations, now, not only do nodes
leave the network, but new nodes join at the same time.
For the stable setup, in one of the five simulation passes
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Figure 6: Size 250, k=20, churn 1/1, with traffic
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Figure 7: Size 2500, multiple k, churn 0/1, without traffic
a race condition occurred. A node could not join, because
its bootstrap node had been removed from the network.
In the other four passes, the stable setup was comparable
to the random setup in the graph. Overall the bootstrap
setup seems to handle the churn best. After 280 minutes
of churn, it retains the highest connectivity as well as the
highest average connectivity.
Simulation 6
In this simulation, we used the random scenario for net-
work setup with a network churn of 0/1 and without net-
work traffic. The bucket sizes are 5, 10, 20 and 30. We
present the results in Figure 7. This simulation is analog to
Simulation 1, but with a network size of 2500 nodes. While
in Simulation 1 the network was disconnected for bucket
size 5 at the beginning, it is disconnected in this simulation
for both bucket sizes k = 5 and k = 10. For the larger
network, these bucket sizes seem too small to achieve a
connected graph already during the network setup. Before
the churn starts, the connectivity is close or equal to the
bucket size. During the churn, we again observe increasing
connectivity in the network with decreasing network size.
For the bucket size 20, the connectivity reaches 50, and,
for the bucket size 30, it reaches 80 towards the end of the
simulation.
Simulation 7
In this simulation, we used the random scenario for net-
work setup with a network churn of 0/1 and with network
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Figure 8: Size 2500, multiple k, churn 0/1, with traffic
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Figure 9: Size 2500, k=20, churn 0/19, with traffic
traffic. The bucket sizes are 5, 10, 20 and 30. We present
the results in Figure 8. In comparison to Simulation 6, the
traffic enables faster adaptation to the churn and provides
higher connectivity. Towards the end of the simulation,
the connectivity for the bucket size 20 reaches 80, and, for
the bucket size 30, it reaches 105.
Simulation 8
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenario for network setup with a network churn of
0/19 (burst). The simulation uses network traffic, and the
bucket size is 20. We present the results in Figure 9. While
in Simulation 3 each churn burst led to a notable reduction
of the connectivity, here, the reduction is at most one. On
the other hand, this reduced impact is also notable with
the overall increase of the connectivity, which is almost
non-existent.
Simulation 9
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenario for network setup with a network churn of
0/40 (burst). The simulation uses network traffic, and the
bucket size is 20. We present the results in Figure 10.
As with Simulations 3 and 8, the effect of repeated churn
bursts of twice the bucket size is significantly less than
in Simulation 4. With each churn burst, the connectivity
drops by two. In total, the connectivity increases more
strongly than in Simulation 8, which is probably due to a
stronger decrease in the network size.
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Figure 10: Size 2500, k=20, churn 0/40, with traffic
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Figure 11: Size 2500, k=20, churn 1/1, with traffic
Simulation 10
In this simulation, we used the random, stable and boot-
strap scenario for network setup with a network churn of
1/1. The simulation uses network traffic, and the bucket
size is 20. We present the results in Figure 11. Over
its runtime, this simulation shows a connectivity similar
to that in Simulation 5. Though the network size is ten
times as large, the connectivity under 1/1 churn remains
near the initial value of 20. At minute 8, just at the end of
the initial network setup, the connectivity drops to one for
the random scenario. At the time of the next connectivity
snapshot, the network has recovered, and the connectivity
is back at 20. At minute 281, the connectivity of the sta-
ble scenario drops to zero. As with Simulation 5, this is
due to a race condition in the join process and happened
in one of the five simulation passes.
Simulation 11
In this simulation, we used the random and the bootstrap
scenario for network setup with a network churn of 10/10.
The simulation uses network traffic, and the bucket size
is 20. We present the results in Figure 12. The previous
Simulations 5 and 10 have shown connectivity problems
for either the random or the stable scenario. To better
evaluate the effect of this kind of churn, we performed an
additional simulation with 10/10 churn. As representative
of the setups with random selection of bootstrap nodes we
chose the random setup and compared it to the bootstrap
setup.
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Figure 12: Size 2500, k=20, churn 10/10, with traffic
The random scenario shows drops in connectivity sev-
eral times during the simulation: it drops to 6 at minute
81, to 1 at minute 141, to 3 at minute 181, and to 8 at
minute 221. Shortly after minute 221, the network be-
comes disconnected and does not recover for the remain-
der of the simulation. The bootstrap scenario oscillates
around the initial connectivity of 20, but does neither ex-
perience significant drops in connectivity nor becomes dis-
connected.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we analyzed the communication resilience
of a highly distributed self-organizing CPS. Such a sys-
tem exhibits coordination schemata and communication
requirements similar to structured overlay networks. To
achieve reliable self-adaption, we require redundant com-
munication channels for resilient inter-node communica-
tion. Specifically, we used Kademlia as the communication
overlay for the CPS and analyzed its network connectivity
by simulations.
Our main result from the simulations is that the net-
work connectivity κ of Kademlia strongly correlates with
its bucket size k. In most simulations, the network con-
nectivity was equal or higher than k. There are also cases,
especially with high churn, when the network connectivity
drops significantly under k. However, to achieve a certain
resilience level r in a CPS, we require a network connectiv-
ity κ > r. With our results, we determined that the bucket
size needs to be set to a value higher than r, i.e., k > r.
Nevertheless, the resilience level cannot be guaranteed.
In the future, we plan to extend Kademlia to guarantee
the network connectivity in all cases. Even more, we plan
to introduce a parameter into Kademlia for controlling its
connectivity independently of the bucket size.
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